The Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology is administered by Tamar Szabó Gendler, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and Vincent J. Scully Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Psychology and Cognitive Science at Yale University.
Note: Deadline extended! Submissions are now due by October 15th, 2019.
Current Competition Details
The Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology is a biennial essay competition open to scholars who are within fifteen (15) years of receiving a Ph.D. or students who are currently enrolled in a graduate program. Independent scholars may also be eligible and should direct inquiries to the Editors of OSE (see below.)
The award is $5,000. Winning essays will be published in Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
Submitted essays must report original research in epistemology. Essays should generally be between 7,500 and 15,000 words. Longer essays may be considered, but authors must seek prior approval by providing the Editors with an abstract and a word count before submission. Since winning essays will appear in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, submissions must not be under review elsewhere. To be eligible for the next prize, submissions must be received, electronically, by October 15th, 2019. Authors should include with their submissions an abstract of no more than 500 words. Refereeing will be blind; authors should omit remarks and references that might disclose their identities. Receipt of submissions will be acknowledged by e-mail. The winner will be determined by a committee of members of the Editorial Board of Oxford Studies in Epistemology or by a committee deputized by them for this purpose and will be announced in November. (The Editorial Board reserves the right to extend the deadline further, if no essay is chosen.) At the author’s request, the Board will simultaneously consider entries in the prize competition as submissions for publication in Oxford Studies in Epistemology independently of the prize.
Inquiries and submissions should be directed to email@example.com.
Miriam Schoenfield, MIT
Title: Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily (PDF)
The Marc Sanders Foundation and Oxford Studies in Epistemology join in congratulating Miriam Schoenfield as the winner of the Sanders Prize in Epistemology for her paper “Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.” Miriam is Associate Professor of Philosophy at MIT.
Abstract: Had we grown up elsewhere or been educated differently, our view of the world would likely be radically different. What to make of this? This paper takes an accuracy-centered first-personal approach to the question of how to respond to the arbitrary nature in which many of our beliefs are formed. I show how considerations of accuracy motivate different responses to this sort of information depending on the type of attitude we take towards the belief in question upon subjecting the belief to doubt.
Jason Konek, University or Bristol
Title: The Art of Learning (PDF)
Abstract: Confirmational holism is at odds with Jeffrey conditioning—the orthodox Bayesian policy for accommodating uncertain learning experiences. Two of the great insights of holist epistemology are that (i) the effects of experience ought to be mediated by one’s background beliefs, and (ii) the support provided by one’s learning experience can and often is undercut by subsequent learning. Jeffrey conditioning fails to vindicate either of these insights. My aim is to describe and defend a new updating policy that does better. In addition to showing that this new policy is more holism-friendly than Jeffrey conditioning, I will also show that it has an accuracy-centered justification.
Sophie Horowitz, Rice University
Title: “Accuracy and Educated Guesses” (PDF)
The Marc Sanders Foundation and Oxford Studies in Epistemology join in congratulating Sophie Horowitz as the winner of the Sanders Prize in Epistemology for her paper “Accuracy and Educated Guesses.” Sophie is Assistant Professor at Rice University and her paper will appear in Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
Abstract: Credences, unlike full beliefs, can’t be true or false. So what makes credences more or less accurate? I offer a new answer to this question: credences are accurate insofar as they license true educated guesses, and less accurate insofar as they license false educated guesses. I argue that this account can be used to justify certain coherence constraints on rational credence, and has other advantages over rival accounts of accuracy.
An Honorable Mention goes to David Barnett, the runner-up, for his paper titled, “Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater”.
Michael Titelbaum, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Title: “Rationality’s Fixed Point“ (PDF)
The Marc Sanders Foundation and Oxford Studies in Epistemology join in congratulating Michael Titelbaum as the winner of the Sanders Prize in Epistemology for his entry “Rationality’s Fixed Point.”
This year there were 61 entries for the prize which, after a rigorous review process, were reduced to an exceptionally strong field of 6 finalists.
Michael’s paper will appear in Oxford Studies in Epistemology along with the two runners up papers by Sarah Moss (University of Michigan), “Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Uncertainty”, and John Bengson (University of Wisconsin-Madison), “Grasping the Third Realm.”